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CASE COMMENTS
agreement into a court decree gives it the same force as the decree, 20
this rule would also apply when an arbitration clause is involved. Per-
haps, incorporation by reference, or approval of the agreement contain-
ing the clause would be sufficient.
The use of arbitration in separation agreements is at present
relatively untested because of the lack of instances in which it has
been judicially noted. Much is written about the current congestion
prevalent on court dockets. Courts themselves should relieve this con-
gestion whenever possible.2' Incorporation of the arbitration clause
of a separation agreement into a court decree and subsequent en-
forcement thereof would aid in relieving this problem in the field of
domestic relations. This practice might be applied also to resolve
disputes arising when alimony payments need to be adjusted to meet
changing circumstances. It is submitted that an arbitration clause in
a separation agreement is a tailor-made technique for settling marital
disputes in a private forum.
JOHN H. TATE, JR.
REMARKS ABOUT APPEAL AS PREJUDICIAL
IN CRIMINAL CASES
Remarks in court in a criminal case regarding the right of a de-
fendant to appeal raise the question of whether such remarks lessen
the jury's sense of responsibility with resultant prejudice to the ac-
cused. This problem was dealt with in State v. Clark,' a recent rape
case from Oregon in which the defendant was convicted and appealed.
The trial court gave the following instruction to the jury:
"If the defendant here is dissatisfied with the rulings of this
court as to the law, he has the right of appeal to the Supreme
Court and that Court can correct any mistakes which this court
may make as to the law of the case...2.2
The Supreme Court of Oregon affirmed the conviction stating that
-IRichards v. Richards, 85 Ga. App. 6o5 , 69 S.E.2d 911, 913 (1952); Davis v.
Davis, 229 Ind. 414, 99 N.E.2d 77 (1951).
21"Finally, any doubts as to the construction of the Act [arbitration] ought
to be resolved in line with its liberal policy of promoting arbitration both to ac-
cord with the original intention of the parties and to help ease the current con-
gestion of court calendars." Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271
F.2d 402, 410 (2d Cir. 1959).
2362 P.2d 335 (Ore. 1961).
2Ibid.
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while, the giving of the instruction was error, it was not prejudicial
error so as to justify reversal. However, the court noted that the possi-
bility of prejudicial error in certain situationg was sufficiently great
to warrant discontinuance of the practice of giving the instruction.3
Although the court did little to explain the decision, it did state
that the challenged instruction was not made "with the intent to
cause a jury to shirk its responsibility in deciding the facts, but rather
with the intent to impress upon the jury its responsibility to accept
the law as it comes from the court.' 4 The court said that it is not every
error that justifies reversal and pointed out that in view of the entire
record there was no probability of prejudice in this case. 5
Although remarks in court concerning a defendant's right of ap-
peal are generally undesirable, there are two views in the United
States as to whether the giving of such instructions constitutes revers-
ible error. Under one view a conviction will not be reversed unless
the appellate court finds there was the probability of prejudicial error,6
while under the other view, the possibility of prejudicial error results
in automatic reversal.7 .
Jurisdictions in accord with the principal case simply take the
view that remarks concerning a defendant's future relief do not con-
stitute substantial harm so as to warrant reversal.8 The Oregon Su-
preme Court seems to couch its decision in terms of probability. That
is, even if the instructions complained of had not been given, the
jury probably would have found the defendant guilty.9 California
explains in a similar situation that "the jury in all probability would
have rendered a verdict of guilty."1°
Those jurisdictions which take the view that such instructions auto-




Fiorella v. City of Birmingham, 35 Ala. App. 384, 48 So. 2d 761, 766 (195o);
People v. Danford, 14 Cal. App. 442, 112 Pac. 474 (191o); State v. Satcher, 124 La.
1oi5, 5o So. 835 (909); State v. Seaman, io N.J. Super. 439, 77 A.2d 284 (195o); State
v. Leaks, 126 N.J.L. 115, 18 A.2d 3 (1941).
7-folt v. State, 2 Ga. App. 383, 58 S.E. 511 (1907); People v. Silverman, 252
App. Div. 149, 297 N.Y. Supp. 449 (2d Dep't 1937); People v. Santini, 221 App.
Div. 139, 222 N.Y. Supp. 683 (1st Dep't 1937); People v. Sherwood, 271 N.Y. 427,
8 N.E.2d 581, 584 (1936). Cf., Coward v. Commonwealth, 164 Va. 639, 178 S.E. 797
(1935).
8State v. Seaman, supra note 6 at 286.
9362 P.2d at S36.
"People v. Cabaltero, 31 Cal. App. 2d 52, 87 P.2d 364, 369 (1939); People v.
Stembridge, 99 Cal. App. 2d 15, 221 P.2d 212, 217 (1950).
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sider such matters as appeal, because the knowledge of future review
by other authorities may lead the jury to evade its responsibilities and
compromise on the question of guilt. The possibility of lessening the
seriousness of the jury's determination is based upon the theory that
if the jury incorrectly convicts an innocent man, the mistake may still
be corrected by a higher court." This is the New York rule on the
propriety of giving instructions similar to 'those in the principal case.
In People v. Silverman the New York court held that prejudice arose
from references to the defendant's right of appeal stating that "if the
jury made a mistake the error might also be cured by an appeal."'12
The logic of such reasoning is not of recent origin. The early Georgia
case of Hodges v. State noted that "the fact that a defendant, in a
criminal case, may take up his case to the Supreme Court is no reason
why he should not have meted out to him, by the Court and Jury, the
full measure of his legal rights."' 3
The courts following the New York rule seem to couch their
opinions in terms of "possibility" of prejudice to the accused. The
test is whether the remarks "might have"'14 or possibly did influence
the jury in the verdict returned as to its nature, character, degree, or
amount. The significance of possible injury to a defendant is recog-
nized in a Georgia statute that makes a mistrial mandatory if reference
is made in court to subsequent relief open to the accused.15
In a similar although not identical situation, the prosecution's re-
marks to a jury regarding appeal have been held to constitute re-
versible error. Due to the nature of our adversary system this situation
arises more frequently than that in the principal case, but the possible
effect upon the jury seems indistinguishable. Analogous to the question
raised in the principal case, there are two main views. Those juris-
dictions that follow Oregon would say that such remarks are unneces-
sary and improper but not so prejudicial as to justify reversal.16 Juris-
dictions adhering to the New York rule would reverse and remand.
In the New York case of People v. Esposito the prosecutor said, "I
wish to call your attention to the fact that defendant can appeal from
"Kelly v. State, 21o Ind. 38o, 3 N.E.2d 65 (1936); Davis v. State, 200 Ind. 88,
161 N.E. 375, 383 (1928).
1-77 A.2d at 287.
is 5 Ga. 117, 118 (1854).
ilPait v. State, 112 So. 2d 380, 386 (Fla. 1959); McCall v. State, i2o Fla. 707,
163 So. 38 (935)-
'
1
Ga. Code Ann. § 27-22o6 (Supp. 1961); Wilson v. State, 212 Ga. 157, 91 S.E.2d
16 (1956); McKuhen v. State, 12o Ga. App. 75, 115 S.E.2d 625 (Ct. App. 196o).
'"Norris v. State, 16 Ala. App. 126, 75 So. 718 (1917); State v. Merryman, 78 Ariz.
73, 283 P.2d 239 (1955); People v. Nolan, 126 Cal. App. 623, 14 P.2d 88o (1932).
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this decision of yours to the Court of Appeals, but the prosecution can-
not.".1 7 The appellate court reversed the conviction. In another New
York case, People v. Johnson, the court held that the jury has nothing
to do with appeals and that the jurors have a sufficient task to per-
form in finding the truth and returning a verdict without regard to
alternate consequences.' 8
However, in the area of remarks by prosecutors a distinction may
be made from the situation presented in the principal case in that
errors by counsel in making such remarks can sometimes be overcome
by the court's admonishing the jury to disregard them.19 On the other
hand, some courts feel that withdrawal of the remarks by the court
does not cure the error committed, and hold that the impression of
such remarks on the minds of the jurors entitles the defendant to
a new trial.2 0
Reviewing courts are frequently confronted with the determina-
tion of whether improper remarks made during the course of a trial
are prejudicial or merely harmless. Occasionally, the conclusion is
quite obvious. For example, the misreading of a defendant's Christian
name in the charge is clearly incorrect, but not reversible error.21
whereas the failure to instruct as to guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
constitutes prejudice.22 Unfortunately, not all errors are so easily
classified. In some situations one judge may consider particular re-
marks prejudicial while another would consider them harmless.
When either court or counsel have made improper remarks about
a criminal defendant's right to future relief, the New York rule re-
quiring reversal is preferable because it insures to the accused an
absolutely impartial trial.2 The "possibility" of prejudice as a
basis for remand seems more in keeping with other well-established
protections provided for the criminally accused, such as the require-
ment of proof of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, which is buttressed
by the shielding presumption of innocence. The use of a "probability"
test, as in the principal case, may result in a trial in which the reason-
2"224 N.Y. 370, 121 N.E. 344, 346 (1918). See also People v. Friedt, 28o App.
Div. 836, 113 N.Y.S.2d 889 (2d Dep't 1952); People v. Teiper, 186 App. Div. 830,
175 N.Y. Supp. 197 (4th Dep't 1919).
8284 N.Y. 182, 3o N.E.gd 465 (1940).
"State v. Benjamin, 309 S.AW.d 602 (Mo. 1958); Gray v. State, 191 Tenn. 526,
235 S.W.2d 2o (1950).
'4State v. Hawley, 229 N.C. 167, 48 S.E.2d 35, 36 (1948).
2rState v. Gilliam, 351 S.W.2d 723 (Mo. 1961).
=Pollard v. State, 155 Tex. Crim. 488, 237 S.W.2d 3O (1951).
"People v. Johnson, supra note 18.
